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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20001014-CA
DEREK ANDREASON,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ARGUMENT
I. DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
DENIED.
Review of appellant's brief, (hereinafter defendant, or Mr. Andreason), and the brief
filed by appellee, (hereinafter the State), demonstrates that defendant's motion to dismiss
made at the close of the State's evidence should have been granted. Review of the evidence
which was before the court demonstrates that the State failed to produce evidence that
defendant intended to defraud Alan Nielsen, John Rowley, Sevier County or the public.1

1

In arguing that the State failed to make its burden of presenting a prima facie case
prior to defendant's motion to dismiss, defendant has not given any weight or
consideration to the facts that the prosecutor claimed and argued were in evidence, but
-1-

There was no evidence that defendant knew of the alleged forgery, or that he had knowledge
that he was perpetrating a fraud.2 In State v. Stringham, 2001 Ut App 13, 412 Utah Adv.
Rep. 3 9 , 1 7 P.3d 1153, 1159 (Utah App. 2001), this court set forth the standard for review
of a motion to dismiss as follows:
We will uphold a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence
if, "upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn
from i t , . . . Some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the
elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Kihlstrom, 1999
Ut. App 289 at p.8, 988 P.2d at 952 (Quoting State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225
(Utah 1989)). "We review for correctness the trial court's conclusion that the
evidence established a prima facie case."Id.

In the case at bar. there is no evidence from which a jury or judge could find that the
elements of forgery could be proved. Review of each of the briefs previously filed by the
parties demonstrates that for purposes of review of defendant's motion to dismiss, the
contest is over whether there was sufficient evidence in the record to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant intentionally acted "with a purpose to defraud anyone, or
with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated." (UCA 76-6-501 (1999).
Despite a complete lack of any evidence or inference that defendant knew of any problem

consideration to the facts that the prosecutor claimed and argued were in evidence, but
which were never offered. Because the prosecutor's unsupported arguments were
considered by the trial court as part of the evidence, they are addressed elsewhere in this
brief, and in defendant's prior brief.
2

In its brief, the State concedes that the court did not base its ruling on defendant
facilitating a fraud against Nielson, and did not argue that point. (Brief of Appellee p.
9,10).
-2-

with the plans, the State argues that communications with John Hicks, and a letter from John
Hicks are sufficient to prove intent to defraud, or knowledge that a fraud is being perpetrated
beyond a reasonable doubt. In making this argument, the State rests its entire case on a letter
Mr. Hicks sent to defendant (Exhibit 3), explaining that the first set of plans (exhibit 2) were
too old and that prior to approval by Sevier County they would need to be re-stamped by an
architect or engineer.
Contrary to the State's argument, the fact that defendant did not explicitly obey the
letter from John Hicks, does not automatically demonstrate a purpose to defraud, or a
knowledge that a fraud is being perpetrated. Without explaining how defendant was to have
known that there was a problem with the plans, the State argues that defendant gained some
advantage by re-submission of the plans. Review of the evidence which was before the
court at the time defendant made his motion to dismiss proves that there was no
demonstrated or inferred advantage to the defendant. The evidence also demonstrates that
at the close of the State's case there was no evidence that this alleged crime had a victim.
In the Brief of Appellee, on page 13, the State admits that exhibit 1 is a cleaner copy
of plans defendant submitted two weeks earlier. (Exhibit 2). That fact is important because
exhibit 2 is unquestionably a 20 year old set of plans. Therefore, although the State failed
to discuss defendant's knowledge and intent as they existed in the late 1970's in its brief, in
reality defendant's knowledge and intent must be considered in light of his knowledge and
intent regarding exhibit two.

->

When the State rested its case, it had failed to produce evidence of intent to defraud
Alan Nielson, John Rowley either in 1998, or in 1978. The uncontroverted evidence was
that Alan Nielson was the engineer on the project in 1978, and was paid for his work.
(Tr.2:59:6 to 61:19). John Rowley was the architect on the 1978 project, and was fully
compensated. (Tr.2:39, through Tr.2:52, Exhibits 4-22, Tr.2:37) Neither in the State's case
in chief nor at any time did the State present any evidence that any funds would have been
owing to John Rowley or Alan Nielsen because the 1978 plans were recycled in 1998. With
the concession that exhibits 1 and 2 are identical, any knowledge on the part of the
defendant that he was perpetrating a fraud would have to have existed at the time the plans
(exhibit 2), were produced in the late nineteen seventies, because if it is to be inferred that
defendant knew of the problems with the documents when they were submitted in 1998, he
would have to know there was a problem with the documents in the late nineteen seventies
when they were originally prepared. The State never presented any evidence either direct
or by inference that defendant knew of the problems with the documents when they were
prepared in the seventies, or that there would have been any reason to know ether that there
were problems or to forge them himself. There was no evidence that defendant knew of the
forgery.
The same lack of evidence is existent with the claim that there was an intent to
defraud Sevier County. The State argues demonstration of an intent to defraud based merely
on the submission of the plans, claiming that submitting the plans in effect constituted a
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representation that the plans had been reviewed and re-stamped.

The State argues that the

re-submission of the plans was intended to gain an advantage because defendant would
somehow be able to avoid code revisions. The State's argument fails for lack of support in
the record.
Review of the record demonstrates that the State completely failed to demonstrate that
the plans were not up to code. Just as there is no evidence that defendant intended to
defraud the architect or engineer, there is no evidence that defendant had an intention to
defraud the public or Sevier County by using plans that are not up to code. Mr. Hicks did
not review exhibit number 1 to see if it was up to code, (Tr.2:30-31, Tr.2:32:l 1-14), nor did
he compare exhibits 1 and 2 to see if they are identical. (Tr.2:.27:16 to 27:1). There is no
evidence in the record to support the inferences the State seeks in its argument. Inferences
cannot be drawn without support in the record.
Analysis of the State's brief demonstrates the shortcomings in the evidence, and the
attempts to overcome the lack of evidence with a vigorous argument. In its brief (Brief of
Appellee at p. 14), the State claims that defendant represented to John Hicks that the plans
had been "reviewed and re-stamped." That is exactly the argument the prosecutor claimed
in his opening statement would be in evidence, (Tr.2:12-13), and which he argued repeatedly
was in evidence. (Tr.2:96,97, Tr.3:234, Tr.3:259. Tr.3:260, 261). There is however, no
support for the claimed representation in evidence as demonstrated by the State's failure to
support the claimed representation with a citation to the record. Defendant has addressed
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the fact that the trial court relied on this claimed "evidence" which was never offered
elsewhere in this brief and in his previous brief.3
At the time defendant moved to dismiss this matter there was no evidence that Mr.
Andreason knew of the alleged problem with the stamp, no evidence that he knew the
signature was forged, and no evidence of intent to defraud anyone. In reality, defendant has
been convicted of committing a crime with no evidence of a victim. Because the State's
evidence was lacking, defendant's motion to dismiss should have been granted and his
conviction must be reversed.
II. THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE REQUIRES REVERSAL OF
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION.
As set forth in his previous brief, defendant has never contested many of the elements
of forgery, such as identity, and location of the offense in Sevier County. Defendant has
continuously contested the elements dealing with whether he was perpetrating a fraud, or
knew that a fraud was being perpetrated. Review of the record demonstrates that despite
the State's cries to the contrary, during the presentation of defendant's case there was no
additional evidence gained to support the State's theory of the case, while a great weight
of evidence was presented supporting defendant's position that he had no reason to forge
the documents.

3

The State concedes that this evidence was never offered in footnote 6 of page 22
of the Brief of Appellee.
-6-

When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, the reviewing court
must give consideration to whether the decision of the court below is against the clear
weight of the evidence. Spanish Fork v. Bryan 1999 Ut. App. 61, p.5, 975 P.2d 501. The
Utah Supreme Court defines weight of the evidence as: ". . . that quantum of relevant
evidence that would tend to convince a reasonable person of a conclusion.." Zissi v. State
Tax Commission of Utah. 842 P.2d 848, 853 (Utah 1992).
In its brief the State, rather than arguing the weight of the evidence which was before
the court, instead effectively ignores all of the evidence presented by the defendant, and
instead repeats the sparse evidence presented in the State's case in chief as though it can gain
substance through repetition. (Brief of Appellee p. 14). In his reply, defendant will point out
the substantial evidence supporting his acquittal, and will address the claims made by the
State.
At trial the defendant presented substantial and uncontroverted evidence that exhibits
1, 2, and 30 are identical and were produced from exhibit 23. (See exhibits 1, 2, 23, 30,
Tr.3:169, 174,175). This fact is important because it is uncontroverted that exhibits 2, 23
and 30 were produced in the late nineteen seventies, and are the plans used to construct
defendant's other four-plexes. Therefore, if exhibit 1 was a forgery in 1998, it was a
forgery in 1978. Further, if defendant knew that there were problems with exhibit 1 when
it was presented to Sevier County in 1998, he had to have known that the same problems
existed in 1978 when the plan was first used and presented. The State's case lacks any
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evidence that defendant knew of the forgery either in 1978 or 1998, or that he would have
had any motive to forge the plan when it was originally prepared. It was uncontroverted
both before and after the close of the State's evidence that Alan Nielson and John Rowley
were hired to do the work represented by the plan and that they were paid. (Tr.2:59-61,
Tr.2:39-52). In its arguments regarding the weight of the evidence, the State has entirely
ignored that uncontroverted fact. The weight of that fact, however is sufficient to shift the
weight of the evidence toward acquittal based on a lack of any evidence of intent to defraud,
and on overwhelming evidence that defendant would have no reason to forge the contested
document.
In attempting to support the conviction, the State ignores all of the evidence presented
by the defendant, and continues to argue that sufficient evidence exists to sustain conviction.
The State attempts in part to use facts that were not contested at trial to support this claim.
(Brief of Appellee, 15. 16). The State also attempts to key in on specific facts which it
claims support an intent to defraud, or knowledge that defendant is facilitating a fraud.
The State's first claim is that defendant was somehow attempting to facilitate a fraud
on John Rowley. The State supports its argument with a reference to exhibit 5 which
indicates that Rowley was to design "3 units only." There are several problems with this
argument. To begin with, if defendant owed Rowley money for using the plans, it would
necessarily mean that Rowley did the work represented by the plans and had earned that fee.
If Rowley did the work on the plans to earn the fee. the stamp is not a forgery. If on the
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other hand the stamp is a forgery, defendant would not owe anything to Rowley because
Rowley did not do the work represented, and Rowley would not be the victim of the
fraudulent representation. In its argument (Brief of Appellee p. 16), the State attempts to cast
Rowley as a victim because his plans were used while containing a forged stamp, and as the
party who earned a fee because he prepared the plans in question. The State even admits
that Rowley was paid to produce the drawings for the first three four-plexes. (Brief of
Appellee p. 16). If Rowley prepared the drawings of the first three four-plexes, Rowley's
stamps on those drawings are not forgeries. The State cannot claim inferences that go both
directions as the notions are mutually exclusive.

The State's claim that Rowley is the

victim also ignores the fact that defendant had corresponded with Rowley, and discussed the
possibility of building an additional unit, (Tr.3:179-80, exhibit 6). The State's claim also
ignores the substantial and uncontroverted evidence that as each four-plex was constructed
the architect was not paid until after preliminary approval. Exhibits 17 through 21 all
demonstrate that payments to the architect on this project all occurred after approval as part
of the construction financing of the project. Assuming arguendo that defendant had some
financial obligation to John Rowley for continued use of the plans, that obligation would not
accrue until after the plans were approved. The State's argument ignores the fact that by the
close of trial, the only victim claimed by the State was the public. (Tr.3:234).
In its brief the State further claims that because defendant took some plans to
engineer Stephen Cohen for review, and that he also made the representation that the plans
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had been "reviewed and re-stamped"4 by Rowley makes clear defendant's intent to defraud
the architect. (Brief of Appellee at 17,18).

This claim is not supported by the evidence.

To begin with, close review of the record demonstrates that after his plans were rejected by
Sevier County the second time the defendant prepared some drawings which were reviewed
by engineer Stephen Cohen and which were used for construction of the final four-plex.
(Tr.2:190,191, exhibit 33). It is not contested that defendant prepared some of the details
in exhibits 1, 2, 23, 30, and 33. Defendant took some of those details and put them on
exhibit 33 which was reviewed and stamped by Stephen Cohen. Exhibit 33 is not identical
to exhibits 1,2,23 and 30. The fact that Defendant took his drawings to Cohen does not
support a claim that defendant defrauded Rowley.D
The State's next argument is that defendant attempted to defraud the public because
when Stephen Cohen reviewed exhibit 33 he made revisions to the thickness of the
handrails. The State claims this revision was based on a code requirement, and that
defendant knew codes had changed over the past 20 years. (Brief of Appellee at 17). In
making this argument the State shows a misunderstanding of what is represented by Mr.

4

The record does not support the State's argument that defendant represented that
the second set of plans had been "reviewed and restamped." That is a claim made several
times by the prosecutor, and which was apparently accepted as true by the trial court but
which is not supported by the evidence. See Brief of Appellant page 31. The State admits
that this evidence was never specifically elicited from John Hicks at trial in footnote 6 on
page 22 of the brief of appellee.
5

There are no findings by the trial court supporting the claim that defendant had an
intent to defraud John Rowley.
-10-

Cohen's revisions to exhibit 33. Despite the State's argument, the red line revision in
exhibit 33 is not an alteration to the handrail detail, and does not change the gage or
thickness. The detail revision in exhibit 33 describes the physical dimensions of the channel
steel into which the stair risers are welded. The original designation "2"xl0" channel iron
1/4 " gage steel," is descriptive, of 10" channel iron but is not a designation commonly used
by engineers and architects. The revised designation "CIO x 15.3 channel" is the common
engineer's designation for the 10" channel iron used to support stair risers. The revision by
Mr. Cohen was not based on a code requirement, but instead was a change made for
convenience in reading the plans. Despite the State's claim there is no evidence that Mr.
Cohen made any revisions to defendant's plans based on code requirements.6 There is also
no evidence of a compromise to health and safety.
The State's next claim is that defendant demonstrated an intent to defraud or
knowledge that he was facilitating a fraud because he failed to comply with John Hicks'
request in exhibit 3 that the plans be "reviewed and re-stamped." The State further argues
that failure to strictly comply with Mr. Hick's request constitutes circumstantial evidence
sufficient to support conviction. (Brief of Appellee p. 17). This argument is deficient in
several respects. First, what exhibit 3 actually says is that the plans must be reviewed and

6

Mr. Cohen made similar changes in other parts of exhibit 33 to facilitate easier
reading of the plans. For example he changed a note requiring 2 x 1 0 headers over the
windows to reflect 2-2x10 headers over the windows as is indicated in the window detail
on the wall framing details. The change made exhibit 33's details consistent.
-11-

re-stamped prior to "approval" by the Sevier County building department. It does not say
they must be reviewed and re-stamped prior to submission.7 Second, there is no evidence
that defendant knew or had reason to know of any problem with the plans. Submitting the
plans without review and re-stamping by an architect or engineer is not criminal conduct
unless the State can prove that the defendant knew the plans contained a forgery. Third, it
is impossible to infer that defendant was representing that exhibit 1 had been "reviewed and
re-stamped" simply by filing it with the county when review of the plan which was
submitted clearly shows that it was produced in 1978. (See exhibit 1). There is nothing on
the document indicating any representation that it was reviewed in 1998. Fourth, despite the
State's argument, defendant did not "falter" when asked about why he resubmitted the plans
after receiving John Hicks letter. Defendant's explanation was that Mr. Hicks "was looking
for a more legible set of plans." (Tr.3:207-209). The fact that the State does not like or agree
with an answer by the defendant does not mean that he "faltered."
As a final attempt to demonstrate that defendant had an intent to defraud or
knowledge that he was perpetrating a fraud, the State argues that perhaps the trial court did
not give any credibility to the defendant based on an incident dealing with a contractor's
license. (Brief of Appellee at 17,18).

The State argues that defendant denied, then

7

Although there are no departures from code requirements in evidence in the case
at bar, at trial Mr. Hicks testified that it is not uncommon to receive plans that have
variations from code requirements, and that when that occurs, a checklist is prepared and
the plans are sent back to the architect or engineer. (Tr.3:233).
-12-

admitted the incident proving his lack of credibility. The problem with the State's argument
is that it is not supported by a close reading of the record. On cross examination defendant
was asked:
Q. Well isn't it true that when you obtained your relicensor, (sic) you used the name
of an engineer, your engineer, and he was in fact deceased?
A. No.8
The trouble with the State's argument is that it claims the defendant was being deceptive in
his answer when he was in fact not being asked the right question. There is no evidence that
defendant used the name of a deceased engineer in a licensing application. The incident the
prosecutor apparently intended to ask defendant about dealt with an electrician, not an
engineer. When he was asked the proper question, he immediately answered affirmatively,
(Tr.3:215), and on redirect examination he folly explained the circumstances of the situation.
(Tr.3:227, 228). The State cannot claim deceptiveness or lack of candor where defendant
honestly answered the question which he was asked.

No inference or evidence of

untruthfulness or lack of candor is present in the record.
III. THE PROSECUTOR ARGUED AND THE COURT RELIED ON FACTS
WHICH
WERE NOT IN EVIDENCE.

8

Later, Mr. Andreason was asked: Did you use a name in your application for
relicensor (sic) of a person that was deceased?
A. I had an electrician for me died during the time he was working for me, and yes,
and I - but he died. I didn't know that he'd died either, but he had been listed with me as
an electrician, yes.
-13-

In its brief, the State argues that on the numerous occasions when the prosecutor
argued facts which were not in evidence, he was just arguing reasonable inferences
supported by the record, and that arguments by a prosecutor are not evidence. (Brief of
Appellee, 18,19). The defendant understands, and agrees with the State's argument that
^statements made during opening argument are not evidence." ( Brief of Appellee p. 20).
Defendant has never argued that the statements were evidentiary in nature. The problem is
that the prosecutor's statements were treated as evidence by the trial court without the
prosecution ever offering the claimed evidence to support the charge. (See Utah R. Cr. P.
17(g)). Had the State actually produced the evidence which the prosecutor claimed he
would produce in his opening statement, (Tr.2:12.13), this argument would be moot.
Review of the trial transcript demonstrates that although this claimed evidence was never
offered, the State repeatedly argued the case as though there were supporting evidence in the
record. (Tr.2:96,97, Tr.3 234, Tr.3:259,260, 261). A more serious problem is that the trial
transcript also demonstrates that the trial court treated the unsupported statements of the
prosecutor as though they were evidence which was in the record. (Tr.2:100, Tr.3:235,
Tr.3:249, Tr.3 252-255, Tr.3:259, Tr.3:268).
In its brief, the State has ignored the fact that a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is
a two prong test. First, there must be statements made which call the attention of the trier
of fact to matters which should not be considered in reaching a verdict. Second, there must
be a demonstration that the trier of fact was actualh influenced by the improper remarks in
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reaching a verdict. State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 402 (Utah 1986), State v. Emmett.
839 P.2d 785 (Utah 1992). In the case at bar, it is clear that improper statements were made
both in the opening statement and at other points in the trial, and that they were relied on by
the trier of fact. In arguing that statements of the prosecutor are not evidentiary, the State
has completely ignored the record which shows that the statements were relied on by the
judge. It is the reliance on the non-evidentiary statements of the prosecutor by the trial judge
which constitutes the error in this case.
In attempting to sustain the oft repeated unsupported arguments of the prosecutor, the
State asserts that although there is no actual evidence supporting the claims of the
prosecutor, the statements constitute are proper inferences. (Brief of appellee at 21).
Review of the record, and consideration of the definition of an "inference" eliminates the
State's argument from serious consideration. In State v. Hester, 3 P.3d 725, 730 (Utah App.
2000) this court discussed the differences between inference and speculation. The court
stated:
. . . While it is sometimes subtle, there is in fact a difference between drawing a
reasonable inference and merely speculating about possibilities. An inference is "a
conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence
from them." Black's Law Dictionary 781 (7 th Ed. 1999). Stated another way/w[a]n
inference is a deduction as the existence of a fact which human experience teaches
us can reasonably and logically be drawn from proof of other facts." Manchester v.
Dugan 247 A.2d 827,829 (Me. 1968). On the other hand, speculation is defined as
the "act or practice of theorizing about matters over which there is no certain
knowledge." Black's Law Dictionary 1407 (7 th ed.1999).

-15-

In the case at bar. the key issue is whether there is any evidence that defendant acted
with an intention to defraud, or acted knowing that he was perpetrating a fraud. Without
support in the record, the State is arguing that the court should be able to "infer" that an
affirming conversation must have occurred between the defendant and John Hicks wherein
the defendant orally stated that the plans had been "reviewed and re-stamped" by an
architect. (Brief of Appellee at 21). In seeking this inference, the State ignores the fact that
John Hicks testified for the State both in the State's case in chief, and on rebuttal, and never
indicated that the defendant made such a statement. (Tr.2:19-36, Tr.3:230-234). The State
also ignores the fact that such statement would not have fit the logical sequence of events
as they were presented to the trial judge. 9

The conversation between John Hicks and Mr.

Andreason was one where defendant was being told his plans had already been rejected
because they had not been signed, not one where he was turning the plans in for review.
(Tr.3:231). Under Hester inferences must be "reached by considering other facts and

9

Review of the record indicates that when Mr. Hicks reviewed the clear copy of
the plans, (exhibit 1), he noticed that the architect had not signed over his seal. (Tr.
2:20). In its brief, the State claims that John Hicks then called Defendant and asked him
why the seal had not been wet stamped. (Brief of appellant p. 5 lines 3-5). The State
claims that Mr. Hicks then called the residence of the architect to try to resolve the
problem. (Brief of appellee p. 5, lines 5 and 6).
Review of the record clearly shows that Mr. Hicks had already called the
residence of the architect and begun his investigation prior to informing Mr. Andreason
that there was a problem with the second set of plans. (Exhibit 1). On redirect
examination during rebuttal, Mr. Hicks indicated that he had already called the
architect's home prior to having any conversation with Mr. Andreason. (Tr.3:231 line
18).
-16-

deducing a logical consequence from them." What the State is urging is speculation that
particular statements were made in a particular conversation without the support of the
evidence.
In footnote 6 of its brief the State is apparently attempting to poison the well by
claiming that John Hicks testified at the preliminary* hearing that Mr. Andreason responded
"•yes"' when asked if the plans had been sent back to the architect or engineer. (Brief of
Appellee at P.22, 23 footnote 6). The State further claims that although the preliminary
hearing was held before Judge Kay L. Mclff. Judge Mower would have been exposed to
the testimony through the motion to quash bindover. (R. at 72 A, B and C). In making such
a claim, the State ignores the fact that the motion to quash bindover was never before Judge
Mower. The State's response to defendant's motion to quash bindover was a proposed order
of dismissal of the racketeering charge. Strangely, the order of dismissal proposed by the
State does not appear to be a part of the record. Its absence from the record is not critical
because dismissal of the racketeering charge was confirmed at trial when the prosecutor
stated: "we are not going to pursue the racketeering count." (Tr.2:l 1). The motion to quash
bindover was never submitted for decision, and there was no oral argument or other
proceeding that would have brought the matter to the attention of the trial court. There is
also no indication whatsoever in the record that Judge Mower relied on the preliminary
hearing transcript in any way in making his decision, or that the preliminary hearing
testimony was submitted or argued in the trial court..
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Another obvious difficulty with the State's intimation that the trial judge should
consider preliminary hearing testimony which was heard by another judge as evidence at
trial deals with fairness. When John Hicks changed his testimony at trial and did not testify
about any affirmative declaration by defendant, it was not in defendant's best interest to raise
the issue during cross examination, or to offer evidence that Mr. Hicks was not truthful in
his preliminary hearing testimony. Defendant did not disagree with that portion of Mr.
Hicks testimony as he testified at trial. If this preliminary hearing testimony is allowed
consideration after the fact defendant has effectively been denied his opportunity to respond
to the allegation.
In the final anahsis. it appears that the State's reference in its brief to John Hicks
preliminary hearing testimony is a back door attempt to persuade this court that defendant
is a bad person, and that his conviction should stand despite the lack of evidence at trial and
despite the misconduct of the prosecutor.
The State's final argument in claiming that there was no prosecutorial misconduct,
is a claim that defendant somehow rebutted the prosecutor's characterization of the
evidence erasing any prejudice. (Brief of Appellee p.23). While it is true that defendant
raised the issue of the lack of an affirming statement with the trial court, (Tr.2:97-100,
Tr.3:249-50, Tr.3:253-257), the State cannot claim that the prosecutor's statements were
harmless. Review of the record demonstrates that despite defendant's objections, the trial
judge relied on the statements of counsel as though they were evidence throughout the trial.
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(Tr.2:100, Tr.3:235, Tr.3:249, Tr.3 252-255, Tr.3:259, Tr.3:268). The defendant's attempts
to argue against the statements of the prosecutor had no apparent effect on the trial court,
and the prejudice is obvious. Defendant's conviction must be reversed and remanded.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT.
Comparison of Defendant's initial brief and the brief of the State demonstrates that
the parties strongly disagree regarding whether the trial court made adequate findings of
facts supporting his verdict. The parties do agree however, that the governing rule in this
matter regarding findings is Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which requires
that the court "find the facts specifically and state separately its conclusions of law thereon."
Review of the briefs previously submitted by the parties demonstrates a wide disparity in
interpretation of the rule. According to case law the standard is whether the findings are
"sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to the issues to provide a basis for decision."
State v. Magee 837 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
In its brief the State argues that some of the questions the court asked defense counsel
during oral argument should somehow constitute findings by the trial court. (Tr.3:264-266),
(Brief of Appellee, 25. 26). If the dialog between defense counsel and the court had
occurred as it appears in the State's brief, it would be less difficult to construe the statements
of the trial court as findings. The statements of the court when considered in context
constitute a series of questions which are part of a dialogue with defense counsel. In
context, the comments of the court are statements were made and intended to elicit a
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response from counsel, not pronouncements of the findings of the trial court. (Tr.3:261268). 10

Review of the record demonstrates that the court failed to made the findings

claimed by the State.
This court has stated: %c[T]he ultimate test of the adequacy of a trial judge's findings
is whether they are sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to the issues to provide a basis
for a decision." State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880, 885.886, (Utah App. 1992), quoting State v.
Hurst, 821 P.2d467,471 (Utah App. 1991). Instead of being comprehensive, pertinent and
providing a basis for the decision of the court, the comments of the trial court which the
State claims constitute findings in fact leave more questions unanswered than resolved.
Although the defense put on the bulk of the evidence in this case, review of the findings
claimed by the State would lead an uninformed observer to the belief that defendant did not
tender a defense. Despite the defense that was tendered, there is no finding regarding
defendant's intent to defraud, or knowledge that he is perpetrating a fraud. The absence of
that fact alone is sufficient to warrant reversal.
Other findings that would also be expected in a bench trial are also missing. In effect
the court made no comment on any of the evidence presented by the defendant in support
of his theory of the case. At a minimum, even if the trial court finds against defendant.

10

In its brief, the state uses an ellipsis to patch together dialogue which when
reviewed in its entirety has a different context. Review of the record reveals nearly two
pages of dialogue between the court's question set forth at the top of page 25 of the
State's brief, and the responses by counsel and the court. (Brief of Appellee p.25,
Tr.3:265,266).
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findings on the following issues would appear to have been appropriate. Although it is
conceded by the State, there are no findings regarding whether exhibits 1, 2, and 30 are
identical. There is no finding regarding whether exhibit 23 was the master used to produce
exhibits 1, 2, and 30. There is no finding regarding whether exhibit 2 is twenty years old.
Although it was uncontested, there is no finding regarding whether exhibits 1 and 30 were
prepared and first used in 1978. There is no finding determining a victim of the alleged
forgery. There is no finding regarding whether the John Rowley stamp on exhibit 1 was a
forgery, or regarding who forged the document. There is no finding that the Alan Nielson
signatures were forgeries or that it mattered based on Nielson's testimony that he did the
work represented, and was paid in full. (Tr.2:59, 61,63). There is no finding regarding why
Derek Andreason would have forged the document back in 1978 when he paid the architect
and the engineer in full for the services represented. There is no finding that at any time
from 1978 to the time the plans were resubmitted in 1998 Derek Andreason knew that the
plans contained a forgery.
Although it is a principle that has primarily evolved in civil cases, Utah case law
holds that courts must make findings on all material issues in a case. LeGrand Johnson
Corporation v. Peterson, 18 Utah 2d 260, 420 P.2d 615(1966). If this case is not reversed
as set forth above, it must be remanded for failure to make adequate findings supporting the
verdict. By failing to make findings, the trial court has effectively denied defendant the
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ability to have an appellate court consider the weight of the substantial evidence presented
bv defendant

CONCLUSION
Based on his previous brief and on the foregoing, defendant Derek Andreason asks
that the Court reverse defendant's conviction and enter an acquittal on the basis that the
State failed to meet its burden prior to defendant's motion to dismiss. The same relief is
requested based on the State's failure to offer sufficient evidence to support the conviction.
If the court fails to reverse and acquit, defendant seeks reversal and remand for a new trial
based on prosecutorial misconduct, or a remand requiring the trial court to make additional
findings, prosecutorial misconduct, or remand for additional findings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4 t h day of September, 2001.
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